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DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

# *Central Intelligence Bulletin*

**Secret**

Nº 41

27 September 1972

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Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975A022800110001-6

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No. 0232/72  
27 September 1972

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UGANDA-TANZANIA: Tensions between the two countries appear to be easing.

Somali Foreign Minister Arteh, who has been shuttling between Kampala and Dar es Salaam, announced yesterday that Uganda and Tanzania have accepted a Somali peace proposal, but details have not been announced. Arteh said that some issues are still unresolved. These issues, which may prove difficult to settle, probably include details of a mutual withdrawal of troops from the border and the status of Ugandan guerrillas in Tanzania.

Remnants of the invading guerrilla force appear to have been checked by Ugandan troops near the border. Military action now seems to be limited to mopping up operations by Ugandan troops. Press reports assert that Tanzanian troops are moving back from the border to avoid an inadvertent clash with the Ugandan Army.

In Uganda, President Amin continues to make inflammatory statements and has taken further action against the Asians and the British. Early this week the government announced measures to speed the evacuation of expelled Asians and ordered that Asians who have been permitted to stay must purchase identity cards within a week. Amin continues to implicate the British in the guerrilla invasion and has charged that the UK is hampering the Asian exodus. This week the Ugandan Government ordered a British diplomat to leave the country.

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
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# LAOS: PLAINE DES JARRES AREA



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LAOS: The government offensive in the north continues to make only slight progress.

Under the personal direction of General Vang Pao, elements of one task force have moved onto the southern tip of the Plaine des Jarres, severing the Communists' main supply line to their forces in the Tha Tam Bleung area. The government force found several caches of enemy ammunition, the first significant supplies captured during this year's offensive. North of the Plaine, elements of another task force have advanced from Bouam Long to within three miles of Route 71, an important enemy supply route. Although neither task force has yet encountered serious resistance, there are numerous signs that the Communists are moving troops and supplies for counterattacks.

Vang Pao's other task forces are faring less well. Elements of the force on the western edge of the Plaine abandoned high ground at Phou Then on 26 September after being hit by a coordinated infantry and artillery attack. Other units of this task force held their ground.

On the political front, Communist leader Souphanouvong on 22 September sent another tough message to Prime Minister Souvanna on peace talks. The Communists proposed to send a representative to Vientiane to resume preliminary discussions, and again strongly condemned US "intervention and aggression in Laos."

The Communist special representative for peace talks left Vientiane on 3 September after protesting the government's offensive in the north. Since that offensive has failed to shake their control over the Plaine, however, the Communists evidently see some merit in resuming the hitherto sterile discussions.

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USSR: Slow progress in grain harvesting threatens additional losses.

As of 18 September, the grain harvest was about two weeks late; only 76 percent of all grains had been threshed, compared with about 90 percent in an average year. Most of the unharvested crop is in the New Lands area of Siberia and Kazakhstan, where it is particularly vulnerable because winter weather arrives early. A substantial part of this area has already experienced freezing temperatures.

Cool, rainy weather early in the summer delayed ripening, and the current poor weather complicates harvest operations. Recent rain has flattened some of the crop, making cutting difficult. The Soviet press has reported a shortage of equipment for drying wet grain on the farms and at grain elevators. Transport problems, exacerbated by the complex logistics of sending men and machinery to the harvest area from non-agricultural sectors, have also hindered the harvest.

If this slow pace is maintained, the harvest will extend well into October, when conditions usually deteriorate. When the harvest was late in 1969, for example, snow buried several million hectares of grain. Moreover, the onset of freezing temperatures, while the grain is still wet, could reduce its quality to the point where a significant portion of it would be unsuitable for milling and would have to be used for feed.

Thus, harvest prospects have deteriorated further since the last major round of Soviet grain purchases in early August. Recent reports of negotiations for wheat from West Germany and Romania could reflect a reassessment of the country's immediate needs for milling quality wheat. Confirmed Soviet purchases of grain for delivery by mid-1973 now stand at almost 27 million tons, of which about 18 million tons are wheat.

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NOTE

PHILIPPINES: President Marcos' second decree under martial law declares all the Philippines a "land reform area" and announces that sweeping changes in current landlord-tenant relationships will ensue. Land reform legislation is a popular move in a high-tenancy agricultural country like the Philippines, but it is nothing new--reform legislation exists but there has been little effort to implement it. Powerful economic interest groups control much of the land, especially on Luzon. Although he could make some showcase changes fairly easily, it is by no means certain that Marcos will be willing or able to enforce effective reform even under martial law conditions.

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